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Structural Impacts of Farm 
Program Payment Limitation 
by 
Martin D. Strange and V. James Rhodes 
Since 1970, the amount of payments made to individual farmers by 
Congress under feed grain, wheat, and cotton programs have been 
limited. This ceiling on payments ranged from $20,000 applied in 
combination to all programs to $55,000 applied separately to the 
programs. 
The purpose of a limitation on payments , as originally proposed by G. 
E. Brandow (1955), was to reconcile income and resource adjustment 
goals many thought were incompatible. Under a direct payments 
program, market prices below a target level would trigger income 
supplement payments. Under such a program, opponents argued, farm-
ers would, in effect, be paid to keep excess resources in production. 
Brandow reasoned that by limiting the share of each producer's output 
receiving an income support payment, every producer's marginal prod-
uct would receive no more than the market price. Under this marketing 
quota plan, price would allocate resources and income goals would be 
achieved by direct payments. 
Brandow realized, however, that large producers would be paid 
amounts that would defy presumption of individual need. He therefore 
proposed an absolute limitation for payments, an amount reflecting the 
output of large, efficient family farms. 
Congress never adopted the marketing quota approach as a means of 
reconciling resource adjustment and income goals. It adopted, however, 
the absolute limitation for other reasons, primarily to reduce treasury 
expenditures. Proponents hoped to make more funds available for social 
programs, especially the food stamp program. Congressional debate 
referred to the irony of large payments1 made to producers for not 
growing food while hunger and malnutrition were widespread. The 
Federal Register (1973) reported that large payments were made to 
producers in counties where federal food programs for the poor were 
absent, and the need for them great. Even corn belt Congressmen 
supported the limitation, because most large payments went to cotton 
1 The limitation was adopted in 1970 when direct payments were for set-aside acres , not defiCiency 
payments made when market prices fell below target price levels. 
producers, and "discredited" and "jeopardized" the entire farm pro-
gram. 
Despite this legislative history, the payment limitation was assumed 
to be a policy tool with farm structure implications. There was limited 
opportunity to evaluate these implications. During the limitation's first 
years, the limitation was set at a high level while administration rules 
were weak. Large producers avoided its impact by artificially splitting 
farms into smaller units. After 1973 , administration tightened and the 
limitation level was reduced significantly, however, favorable market 
price conditions meant no payments were made. Adverse price condi-
tions triggered payments in 1978, but few farmers were affected because 
the payment limitation level was high. 
This history led the United States Department of Agriculture's 
(USDA) special report on the structure of U.S. agriculture to conclude, in 
1980, that payment limitations " ... have never proved effective (and 
have) no real substantive effect on the distribution of program benefits or 
the workings of the agricultural economy" (USDA 1981). 
This judgment was confirmed by Lin, Johnson, and Calvin (1981). 
They found that 1,184 of 739,000 (0 .16%) participating farmers and $23.7 
million of $2 billion (1.33%) in payments were affected by the payment 
limitation. This limitation had little overall effect on the distribution of 
payments. Without the limitation, the top 10% of the producers would 
have received 46.64% of the payments in 1978; with the limitation, they 
actually received 45 .92%. They also found that the payment limitation 
was an imperfect discriminator for farm size categories. Only two-thirds 
of the farms affected had more than 2,500 Normal Crop Acres (NCA), and 
only 36.53% of the farms of that size were affected. 
Lin et. al. (1981) were limited in attempts to assess the farm structure 
impact from the limitation, by the circumstantial payment data, for 1978. 
In that year, payments were distributed only among 35% of the 
producers, those who participated in a program that made no payments 
to cotton producers and in which only 40.90% of the acreage in corn was 
enrolled in the program. The limitation that year was set at $40,000,20% 
lower than the present limitation of $50,000. Their analysis was based on 
payments to producers with varying NCAs. This analysis did not identify 
the effect of the limitation on various sized farms as measured by sales of 
all commodities produced. There remained no analysis of how changing 
the limitation level alters the number and percent of producers affected 
by the limitation under alternative defiCiency payment levels, and under 
conditions in which participation by producers of all program commodi-
ties is fuller than it was in 1978. 
Payment Limitation Model 
A model was developed to estimate the impact payment limitations 
had on combined payments for wheat, feed grains, and cotton under 
alternative target price situations. 
The model was based on program provisions and price outlooks 
available to policy makers and farmers in the spring of 1980. Full 
participation was assumed in a program that required no set-aside and 
made no diversion payments. 
Cropping patterns for eight farm size intervals (Census sales classes VI 
- IC) by seven enterprise types (combinations of wheat, feed grains, and 
cotton) were obtained by a special run of data from the 1974 U.S. Census 
of Agriculture. They also were obtained for 30 states accounting for 90% 
or more of the 1974 acreage for the subject crop. The model used corn data 
as a proxy for feed grains. Program yields established for payment 
purposes for each commodity in 1978 were used to estimate average 
output per farm for each enterprise type in each sales size class. The 
model produced relevant payment data against which to apply alterna-
tive limits for 1,736 farm situations (eight sales classes by seven 
enterprise combinations for 31 jurisdictions). See Appendix for the 
computational procedure. 
Six cases representing the application of three payment limitation 
levels to two payment deficiency factors were computed for each farm 
situation. The limitation levels were $50,000 (the 1980 actual limit), 
$30,000, and $10,000. A limit level above the 1980 actual limit was not 
considered because the impact at that level was insufficient to warrant 
analysis under either deficiency factor. The deficiency factors were based 
on differences between alternative target prices and USDA market price 
predictions for the 1980 crop market year. One target price level was the 
actual 1980 targets: 
e $2.35Ibu for corn, 
e$0.584/lb for upland cotton, and 
e $3.63Ibu for wheat. 
The other was a higher target based on most recent USDA cost of produc-
tion data using high 1979 projections and assuming average acquisition 
value as the cost factor for land (U.S. Senate Committee, 1979): 
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• $2.52Ibu for corn, 
• $O.785/lb for upland cotton, and 
• $3 .89/bu for wheat. 
Market prices as predicted by the USDA in spring for the 1980 market 
year were $2.25Ibu for corn and $3.50Ibu for wheat. A slightly lower than 
predicted price was used for cotton ($O.55/lb) to assume a deficiency 
payment at the low target price level. 
The deficiency factors resulting per unit of output for each commod-
ity at each target price level were: 
Wheat 
Corn 
Cotton 
Deficiency Factors 
Level I 
(Low Target) 
$ .13 
.10 
.034 
Level II 
(High Target) 
$ .39 
.27 
.235 
These deficiency factors were then used to calculate average payments 
per farm and total payments in each farm situation using the formula 
required by law: NCA x established yield x deficiency factor = 
payment. 
To apply the alternative payment limitations to each situation, the 
number of acres needed to produce output resulting in a limited payment 
were calculated by dividing the limitation amount by the product of the 
deficiency factor and the established yield. 
Unfortunately, no size distribution of acres within each sales class 
was available to estimate the impact of the payment limitation within the 
sale classes. Simple averages and straight line interpolation tended to 
overestimate farms affected by the limits because farm acreage size 
distribution was skewed within each class toward smaller farm sizes. The 
model estimated distribution of acres within each farm situation by using 
acreage distribution for cash grain farms in Kansas and Iowa, and for 
cotton farms in Alabama, as proxies for wheat, corn, and cotton acre 
distribution. 
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Model outputs for farm size classes were combined into four 
descriptive groups for analysis of the impact of the limitation on farm 
structure as suggested by USDA's farm structure report, A Time to 
Choose. 
Four Descriptive Groups 
Large Farms -$200,000 sales and above 
(Census classes Ib and Ie) 
Medium Farms -from $40,000 to $199,999 in 
sales (Census classes Ia and 
II) 
Small Farms -from $5,000 to $39,999 in 
sales (Census classes III, IV, 
and V) 
Rural Residences-below $4,999 in sales (Cen-
sus class VI) 
Impact of the Payment Limitation 
The results of applying the model to the six cases are presented in 
Tables 1-3 . 
Level I prices result in modest program payments. Payments total 
$1,065 million under the three programs. This sum is two-thirds of the 
actual program payments for 1978 (deficiency and diversion payments 
subject to limitations), but five times those made in 1979. Under Level I 
prices, the mix of payments among commodities approximates the 
historical mix: in aggregate, largest payments are for feed grains, lowest 
for cotton. 
At Level I target prices, proposed payment limitations have signifi-
cant impact on either farm size groups or enterprise groups (table 1). At 
the $50,000 limitation level, few farms are affected « .05% of all farms) 
and they are distributed equally between medium and large farms. All are 
cotton specialty farms, primarily in Arizona and California. State-by-
state analysis indicates a slightly larger absolute number of farms 
affected, still < .05%, and includes some wheat/cotton enterprises, 
including some in Mississippi and Arkansas. 
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TABLE 1 
Impact of Payment Limitation on Farm Size Groups, U.S. 
LOW TARGET PRICES 
Group Share of 
Percent of Group Estimated Number .AD. Farms 
Affected by of Farms Affected Affected by 
Limitation of by Limitation of Limitation of 
Farm Size 50,000 30,000 ~o,ooo 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 
Rural 
Residences 
Small Farms 
Medium Farms 
Large Farms 
All Farms 
Farm Size 
Rural 
Residences 
Small Farms 
Medium Farms 
Large Farms 
All Farms 
* less than. 5'/0 
° ° ° 
° ° ° 
* * 
4 
* 
2 22 
* * 
2 
Percent of Group 
Affected by 
Limitation of 
50,000 30,000 10,000 
° ° ° 
° * 
2 
3 7 39 
~7 25 77 
2 3 16 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
70 n2 12,725 48 48 60 
76 758 8,455 52 52 40 
146 ~,470 21,180 ~OO 100 100 
HIGH TARGET PRICES 
Estimated Number Group Share 
of Farms of .AD. Farms 
Affected by Affected by 
Limitation of Limitation of 
50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
° 
407 13,635 
° 
1 8 
10,498 22,552126,986 64 69 74 
6,449 9,684 29,905 36 30 18 
16,947 32,643170,526 100 100 100 
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TABLE 2 
Farms Affected by Payment Limitation, Various Enterprise Combinations Low Target Prices 
Large Farms Medium Farms Small Farms All Farms 
- Limitation Level -
Enterprise 
Group 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 
- Number of Farms (% of All Farms) -
Cotton only 76 641 3,540 70 587 3,240 0 0 a 146 1,228 6,780 
(100) (85) (42) (100) (82) (25) (84) (32) 
Corn only a a 1,145 0 0 2,590 0 0 0 0 3,735 
(14) (20) (18) 
Corn, cotton 0 22 419 0 42 680 0 0 0 0 64 1,099 
3) 5) 6) 5) 4) ( 5) 
Wheat 0 0 402 0 0 640 a 0 a a 1,042 
5) 5) ( 5) 
Wheat, Cotton 0 83 1,183 0 69 1,466 0 0 0 0 152 2,649 
ell) (14) (10) (12) (10) (13) 
Wheat, Corn 0 0 1,515 a a 3,732 0 0 0 0 5,247 
(18) (29) (25) 
Wheat, Corn, a 11 252 0 14 380 0 0 0 0 25 632 
Cotton 1) ( 3) 2) ( 3) 2) ( 3) 
All Farms 76 757 8,456 70 712 12,728 0 0 0 146 1,469 21,184 (100) 
At the $30,000 limitation 1,470 farms are affected (.1 % of all farms) 
and are distributed equally between large and medium sized farms and 
primarily cotton farms (84%). State analysis shows halfthe affected farms 
(and two-thirds of the affected large farms) are in California. Mississippi, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Texas, and Alabama account for most of the other 
affected farms. 
At the $10,000 limitation only 2.0% (21,180) of the farms are affected 
and over half of those are medium sized farms. Only 22% of the large 
farms are affected (table 1). At this level of limitation, all enterprise types 
are affected. One-third of the affected farms are cotton specialty farms 
and another 20% are diversified farms with cotton (table 2). Corn-only 
farms also are affected. They constitute 18% of the total, and over 
two-thirds of them are medium sized farms. Wheat/corn farms constitute 
25% of the affected farms. Like corn farms, more than two-thirds of those 
affected are medium sized farms. 
At the most severe payment limitation level, farms outside the 
cotton-producing states are affected. The percentage of farms affected in 
each state remains below the national average of 2.0% throughout the 
Corn Belt and the Great Plains Wheat Belt, and below 10% in the wheat 
producing states of the Pacific Northwest, while over one-half of the 
farms in Arizona and 40% of those in California are affected (fig. 1). In the 
latter states, these are predominantly cotton-producing farms. The next 
largest impact is in the Delta states: Arkansas (15%), Mississippi (15%), 
and Louisiana (12%). 
Level II target prices produce program payments in the three 
commodities equal to the historically high 1972 program payments for all 
commodities ($3,961 million, of which 89% was for the study commodi-
ties), although the 1972 program payments were not deficiency pay-
ments. The mix of commodity payments is different, because cotton 
payments are 78% higher than their historical high in 1967, while feed 
grains are higher for all payment years except 1969 and 1972, and wheat 
payments are at the median for payments since 1967. These payment 
levels concentrate payment limitation impacts in cotton producing states 
and farms, relative to historic conditions. 
At Level II payments, limitations begin to have impact. At the $50,000 
limitation level, 2.0% of the farms are affected, and two-thirds of them are 
medium sized farms (table 1). Only 17% of the large farms are affected. Of 
the affected farms, 60% are cotton-only farms and another 34% produce 
cotton with other crops (table 3). By contrast, 3.0% of the affected farms 
8 
CD 
FIGURE 1: Impact of Payment Limitation By Farm Size and State 
(Level I, $10,000 Limitation) 
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TABLE 3 
Farms Affected by Limitation Levels, Various Enterprise Combinations High Target Prices 
Large Farms Medium Farms Small Farms All Farms 
- Limitation Level -
Enterprise 
Group 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 10,000 
- Number of Farms (% of All Farms) -
Cotton 3,852 4,157 4,202 6,280 9,637 12,264 0 0 8,170 10,132 13,796 24,636 
(60) (43) (14) (60) (43) (10) (60) (60) (42) (14) 
Corn 167 1,018 9,989 376 2,301 55,753 0 0 0 543 3,319 65,742 
3) (ll) (33) ( 4) (10) (44) ( 3) (10) (39) 
Corn, Cotton 489 649 743 799 2,162 3,632 0 0 1,482 1,288 2,8ll 5,857 
8) 7) ( 2) 8) (10) ( 3) (ll) ( 8) ( 9) ( 3) 
Wheat 0 402 6,254 0 639 18,069 0 0 0 0 1,041 24,323 
4) (21) ( 3) (14) ( 3) (14) 
Wheat, Cotton 1,489 1,692 1,778 2,163 3,724 6,348 0 365 3,226 3,652 5,781 1l,352 
(23) (17) ( 6) (21) (17) ( 5) (90) (24) (22) (18) ( 7) 
Wheat, Corn 169 1,296 6,354 439 3,210 29,183 0 0 360 608 4,506 35,897 
3) (13) (21) 4) (14) (23) 3) ( 4) (14) (21) 
Wheat, Corn, 282 469 585 442 878 1,738 0 42 398 724 1,389 2,721 
Cotton 4) ( 5) ( 2) 4) ( 4) ( 1) (10) 3) ( 4) ( 4) ( 2) 
All Farms 6,448 9,684 29,905 10,499 22,551 126,987 0 407 13,636 16,947 32,643 170,528 
are corn-only farms, and 15% of the affected farms produce corn, and no 
wheat-only farms are affected. Little difference appears in the distribu-
tion of impacts among enterprise types between large and medium sized 
farms. 
At the $30,000 limitation level, twice as many farms (32,643) are 
affected by the limit, but this is still only 3.0% of the farms in the nation2 
(table 1). Two-thirds are medium sized farms, and 25% of the large farms 
are affected. At this limitation level some small farms are affected, 
although the bluntness of the model does not allow accurate estimation of 
the number. Two-fifths of all affected farms are cotton-only farms, and 
three-fourths produce some cotton. There is a difference between large 
and small farms in the distribution of impact among enterprise types: 
affected small farms are wheat/cotton farms with some wheat/corn/cotton 
(table 3). State analysis shows the cotton belt remains most affected by the 
$50,000 limit; with a large share of the impact in Texas (18% of affected 
farms) and a smaller share in Mississippi (10%) and California (11%). 
Arkansas becomes a significant contributor to the total affected farms 
with 9.0%, and the corn belt states of Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri each 
contribute 4.0%. Wheat belt states remain unaffected, even in the high 
yielding Pacific Northwest. The portion of a state's farms affected 
remains highest in Arizona (69%) and California (48%). 
At the $10,000 payment limitation level, all states and all farm sizes 
are affected. Over 16% of the farms (170,526) are affected and all states 
and all farm size groups are affected. Nearly three-fourths of the affected 
farms are medium sized farms and 8.0% are small farms; only 18% are 
large farms. However, 77% of the large farms are affected while only 2.0% 
of the small farms are (table 1). 
There is a major shift in the type of enterprise affected. At this level, 
39% of the affected farms are corn-only farms and about two-thirds of all 
affected farms produce corn. By contrast, only 14% of the affected farms 
are cotton-only farms, and another 14% are wheat-only farms. The 
distribution of the impact of the limitation among enterprise types varies 
with farm size group. While 44% of the affected medium sized farms are 
corn-only farms, 60% of the affected small farms are cotton-only farms. 
Among the medium sized farms, 71% produce corn; among the affected 
small farms, 98% produce cotton (table 3). Under smaller cotton 
payments, small farm operations would not be affected by the $10,000 
limit. There is an almost inverse relationship between states with high 
numbers of affected farms and states with high percentages of farms 
2 Rounding theresults increases the percentage from 2% to 3%. 
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FIGURE 2: States Most Affected By Payment Limitation 
(Level II, $10,000 Limitation) 
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affected (fig. 2). There are nine states with over 30% of their farms 
affected, together they comprise 24% of the total farms affected. There are 
six states which in combinations account for over half the affected farms, 
and none with more than 25% of its farms affected. Generally, the states 
in the latter group are in the Corn Belt while the states in the former are in 
the Cotton Belt, including irrigated cotton in the Southwest. Only Texas 
appears in both groups (fig. 2). 
Farms affected also exceed 30% in the Pacific Northwest wheat 
producing states, although they account for only 5.0% of the total farms 
affected. The relatively severe impact of the limitation in these states 
compared with Great Plains wheat producing states (where only Kansas 
has over 30% of its farms affected) is attributed to their higher yield due to 
superior moisture rather than to the acreage size of the farms.3 
Another area conspicuously affected is the Mississippi Delta region. 
In the Delta, 45% of the farms are affected (Arkansas-54%, Louisiana 
-44%, and Mississippi-39°/o) and nearly one-third of them are small 
farms. In fact, well over one-fourth of the small farms in the region are 
affected. In this region, 90% of the large farms are affected and 87% of the 
medium sized farms also are affected. Like Texas, these are heavy 
cotton-producing states. 
Effect of a Limitation Based on Farm Size 
A payment limitation intended to have explicit farm size structure 
impacts has to be designed to discriminate among farms in terms of total 
farm output, not just the output of commodities produced within the 
farm program. The structure project report recommended limitation 
based on farm sales size categories. Farms producing gross farm sales 
sufficient to achieve all economies of scale could be given a target price 
covering variable production costs. Because it is unlikely that market 
prices would fall below this level, the effect of such a two-target policy 
would establish a farm sales size limitation as a qualification for 
deficiency payments. The report, based on its own assessment of 
economies of scale for U.S. crop farms, concluded that a $200,000 sales 
size limitation is an appropriate structural policy tool. 
If payments are eliminated for all farms above that sales size, and 
unlimited to all farms below that sales size, a considerably different , 
population of farms would be affected. The impacts of such an approach 
3 Nebraska, with 79% of its total payment for corn is considered Corn Belt in this analysis. 
to the limitation concept for enterprise types and regions4 under Level I 
target price assumptions are presented in Tables 4-8. 
Table 4 shows figures for the 30 states in the model. One-half the 
farms affected by the proposed limitation are in the Corn Belt. That region 
loses 11% of its payment constituting less than one-third the total 
payment lost in the nation. By contrast, one-fourth of the farms affected 
are in the Cotton Belt, where two-fifths of the region's payment 
constituting one-half of the total funds lost would be cut. The Wheat Belt 
suffers the least impact. Only 19% of the farms are affected and 19% of its 
pay is sacrificed. 
TABLE 4 
Region 
Corn 
Cotton 
Wheat 
Mixed 
30-States 
Regional Impact of a Limitation on Payments 
Based on $200,000 Sales Size 
(Level I Target Prices, 30 States) 
Farms Affected Payment Lost 
Percent of Percent of 
All Farms Total Total Payment 
Percent of 
Region's 
NO. Affected (000) Lost Payment Lost 
17,380 49 62,858 31 11 
9,243 26 99,149 49 39 
6,715 19 31,979 16 19 
2,469 7 8,016 4 12 
35,807 101 202,002 100 19 
Nationally, 3.60% of the farms are affected (table 5). The cotton 
enterprises suffer the highest incidence of impact and the highest share of 
the payment lost. This incidence reflects the larger sales size of cotton 
enterprises. 
4 For this analysis, regions are commodity-based. A state is included in the Corn, Cotton, or Wheat 
Belts, respectively, if it depends on the designated commodity for a larger share of its payment than 
does the nation as a whole, and depends less on both of the other two commodities than does the 
nation as a whole. Three states depend on both of two commodities more than the nation as a whole 
and are not included in any region: Georgia, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. These states are 
considered separately as mixed states. 
TABLE 5 
Impact of a Payment Limitation Based on $200,000 Sales Size 
on Farms With Various Enterprise Combinations 
(Level I Target Prices, U.S. Total) 
Farms Affected Payment Lost 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
of of All of of All 
Enterprise Affected Total Enterprise Affected 
Enterprise No. Group Farms (000) Group Farms 
W 9,266 4 24 24,716 13 14 
K 13,491 3 35 37,570 11 21 
C 4,202 9 11 39,133 28 22 
WK 8,575 4 22 41,347 16 23 
wc 1,778 10 5 26,750 35 15 
KC 743 5 2 6,070 23 3 
WKC 585 17 2 6,370 41 4 
TOTAL 38,640 3.6 101 181,966 17 102 
NOTE: Total p~ent figure lower than total p~ent for 30 states because 
national average yield is lower than the yield in the leading states. 
W = Wheat 
K = Corn 
C = Cotton 
WK = Wheat/Corn 
WC = Wheat/Cotton 
KC = Corn/Cotton 
WKC = Wheat/Corn/Cotton 
The impact in aggregate of this farm size limitation is more severe 
than that of a payment size limit even as low as $10,000 at Level I target 
prices. In the 30 states included in the model, 35,807 farms are affected by 
a farm size limit set at $200,000 versus 21,180 farms affected nationally 
by a $10,000 payment limitation. All farms affected by the size limitation 
are by definition large farms. Only 40% of those affected by the $10,000 
payment limitation are large farms. Over three-fourths of the farms 
affected by the farm size limitation are not affected by the payment size 
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limitation. Thus, while more farms are affected by the farm size 
limitation, policy makers are expected to permit larger than presently 
allowed payments to many farms, and to eliminate some below limitation 
level payments to more farms. 
Within regions (tables 6-8), the impact of a farm size limitation based 
on sales of $200,000 would be distributed the same as the present 
program. In the Cotton Belt, Arizona, California, Mississippi, and 
Arkansas would be leaders in both percent of farms affected and percent 
of payment lost. In the Corn Belt, percent of payment lost is similar 
among the states, with Iowa, Illinois, and Nebraska having 59% of the 
total loss. Iowa has an exceptionally large percentage of its farms affected 
(more than twice other states in the region and a larger share of the total 
number of farms affected than any other state in the region, 21%). In the 
TABLE 6 
Impact of a Payment Limitation Based 
on $200,000 Sales Size in Cotton States 
(Level I Target Prices) 
Farms Affected Payment Lost 
state's 
state's Share of 
Percent Share of Percent Total 
of AU Affected of Sta.te's Payment 
Farms Fa.rms in Total. Payment Lost in 
State No. in state Region (000) Lost Region 
liL 54~ 4 6 2,231. ~7 2 
AR 9~2 ~O ~O 8,~9~ 36 8 
AZ 556 39 6 ~3,o89 79 ~3 
CA 2,208 33 24 38,483 78 39 
LA 396 7 4 3,742 29 4 
MS ~,~54 9 ~2 ~8,326 44 ~8 
TN 523 2 6 ~,558 ~3 2 
TX 2,953 7 32 ~3,529 ~6 ~4 
REGION 9,243 8 ~OO 99,~49 39 ~oo 
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Wheat Belt, Kansas has one-third of the affected farms and over one-third 
of the lost pay, although it has one of the smallest shares of farms affected. 
The Pacific Northwest states suffer the largest percentage losses in total 
payment (they each suffer over 30% payment reduction) and together 
account for 38% of the total lost payment, principally because of high 
yields . 
The shift from basing limits on sales size instead of payment size is 
significant among enterprise types (table 5). One-third of the affected 
farms under current policy with a $10,000 limit are cotton-only farms, 
only 11% would be under the proposed limit based on sales size. By 
contrast, twice as many affected farms would be corn-only farms (from 
18-35%), and almost five times as many would be wheat-only farms 
(5-24%). In aggregate, specialized farms would be more severely affected 
by the proposed limit based on gross sales and, among specialized farms, 
the shift would be from cotton farms to corn and wheat farms. 
TABLE 7 
Impact of a Payment Limitation Based 
on $200,000 Sales Size in Wheat States 
(Level I Target Prices) 
Farms Affected payrment Lost 
State's 
state's Share of 
Percent Share of Percent TotaJ. 
of All Affected of State's payrment 
Farms Farms in Total Payment Lost in 
State No. in State Region (000) Lost Region 
CO 837 7 12 3,552 24 II 
ID 862 8 13 3,039 30 10 
KS 2,050 4 31 1l,288 18 35 
MT 407 13 6 2,134 12 7 
ND 929 3 14 3,106 9 10 
OR 589 10 9 2,757 36 9 
WA 1,041 14 16 6,103 33 19 
REGION 6,715 5 101 31,979 19 101 
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TABLE 8 
Impact of a Payment Limitation Based 
on $200,000 Sales Size in Corn States 
(Level I Target Prices) 
Farms Affected Payment Lost 
state's 
state's Share of 
Percent Share of Percent Total 
of All Affected of state's Payment 
Farms Farms in Total Payment Lost in 
State No. in state Region (000) Lost Region 
IA 3,596 13 21 13,684 11 22 
IL 2,784 3 16 13,515 12 22 
IN 1,640 3 9 6,929 12 5 
ICY 383 1 2 3,010 13 3 
MI 969 6 6 1,747 9 3 
MN 1,684 2 10 5,662 10 9 
MO 1,045 2 6 3,302 10 5 
Ne 890 2 5 2,282 17 4 
NE 1,928 3 11 9,397 13 15 
OH 1,252 2 7 871 2 1 
PA 651 2 4 829 9 1 
WI 558 4 3 1,630 7 3 
REGION 17,380 3 100 62,828 11 101 
Of more significance are states with dairy and livestock enterprises 
mixed with grain production which would suffer greater impact, while 
those with less livestock would enjoy reduced affects. Thus, Montana, 
Iowa, Colorado, Washington, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon have the 
largest share of the increase in farms affected, while Arizona, California, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana have far fewer farms affected (table 9). 
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TABLE 9 
Impacts of a Shift from a Payment Amount 
to Sales Size as Basis for Limiting Payments 
(Level I Target Prices) 
Percent of Farms in State 
Affected by Limit Based On: 
$10,000 $200,000 
Payment Sales 
Corn States 
IA 2 13 
IL 2 3 
IN 1 3 
KY 0 1 
MI 1 6 
MN 1 2 
MO 1 2 
NC 1 2 
NE 2 3 
OR 1 2 
PA 1 2 
WI 0 4 
Cotton states 
AL 3 4 
AR 15 10 
AZ 58 39 
CA 40 33 
LA 12 7 
MS 15 9 
TN 2 2 
TX 5 7 
Wheat States 
CO 1 7 
ID 6 8 
KS 1 4 
MT 0 13 
NO 0 3 
OR 6 10 
WA 8 14 
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Difference 
+11 
+ 1 
+ 2 
+ 1 
+ 5 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 4 
+ 1 
- 5 
-19 
- 7 
- 5 
- 6 
° + 2 
+ 6 
+ 2 
+ 3 
+13 
+ 3 
+ 4 
+ 6 
Index of Vulnerability to Payment Limitation 
The key variables in determining eligibility for deficiency payments 
are market price and target price. Market price fluctuates independently 
for each commodity, while target price is determined politically but in 
principle reflects cost of production. A state or region's vulnerability to 
loss of income from application of the payment limitation is a function of 
the dependence of that state or region on a particular crop as its market 
price changes or as its target price is manipulated. Because the target 
price is politically determined, a state or region with a crop mix closest to 
that of the United States as a whole may be least politically vulnerable. 
One with heavy dependence on one commodity may be more vulnerable 
to a political decision to change the target price for that commodity. This 
vulnerability makes the payment limitation a factor in the political 
sensitivity of states and commodity groups to small changes in a 
commodity's target or market price. It also makes congressional represen-
tatives in those states more likely to resist a reduction in the limitation 
level. 
Two factors determine a locale's tendency to resist lower payment 
limitations: (1) the vulnerability to income loss from payment limitation 
resulting from increases in deficiency payments for a single crop, 
and (2) the relationship between large farmers and specific crops. 
An index of relative vunerability was developed to compare the 
sensitivity of each state to a commodity price change with that of the 
United States as a whole. The index is derived by dividing the percent of 
the state's total payment attributable to the indicated commodity at a 
given price level by the percent of the nation's total payment attributable 
to that commodity, and multiplying the result by 100. The higher above 
100 the resulting number, the greater is the state's relative dependence on 
that crop. The lower it is below 100, the less its dependency on that crop 
relative to the United States. At Level I prices, Montana's index for wheat 
is 416 (the share of its income attributable to wheat payments is over four 
times that of the United States as a whole), while Arkansas' index for corn 
is one (the share of its payment attributable to corn is only 1.0% of the 
U.S. share attributable to corn). The sum of the deviations from 100 for 
each commodity indicates the relative extent to which each state is 
dependent on anyone commodity for its total payment. Thus, the closer a 
state's cumulative index is to 100, the more balanced its crop economy 
and the less vulnerable it is to loss of income due to application of the 
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payment limitation when deficiency payments increase for a particular 
commodity. 
This index procedure blends commodities and is, therefore, sensitive 
to the ratio of commodity prices used in the model. Level I prices are more 
consistent with historical conditions and there is more balance between 
.commodities than at Level II prices which produce historically high 
cotton payments and low wheat payments. 
The results of this procedure are presented in Table 10. As expected, 
at Level II prices, the vulnerability index is more severe; that is, the 
commodity-specialized wheat and cotton states deviate further from the 
index standard than at Level I prices. As expected, the states most 
vulnerable to payment limitations when the price of a single commodity 
changes at Level I target prices are the northern wheat-producing states 
with no cotton and little corn, and the cotton states, particularly the Delta 
TABLE 10 
Index of State Commodity Vulnerability 
LEVEL I LEVEL II 
state Wheat Corn Cotton cumuJ.ativeI Ranll Wheat Corn Cotton Cumulative I Rank~ 
At 9 38 344 397 11 6 24 215 285 16 
AR 22 1 419 496 8 12 0 233 321 11 
AZ 40 0 401 461 9 23 0 228 305 13 
CA 49 8 373 416 10 29 5 221 287 15 
co 263 69 165 259 19 338 89 0 349 8 
GA 11 106 181 176 24 9 89 152 154 28 
IA 1 186 0 285 17 1 252 0 356 7 
ID 404 6 0 498 7 502 8 0 594 5 
IL 29 174 0 245 20 40 237 0 297 14 
IN 46 166 0 220 21 62 226 0 264 20 
KS 308 49 0 359 13 392 63 0 429 6 
KY 60 158 3 195 23 81 202 4 227 23 
LA 1 3 437 533 1 1 15 237 321 12 
MI 88 147 0 159 27 118 198 0 216 25 
MN 87 148 0 161 26 117 199 0 216 26 
MO 68 125 75 82 30 73 134 80 81 30 
MS 4 2 437 531 2 2 1 237 334 9 
MT 416 1 0 515 3 516 1 0 615 1 
NC 38 134 86 110 29 40 141 90 III 29 
ND 407 5 0 502 6 506 6 0 600 3 
NE 79 151 0 172 25 107 204 0 211 27 
OR 89 147 0 158 28 119 198 0 217 24 
OK 300 7 109 302 15 283 7 103 279 18 
OR 414 2 0 512 4 513 2 0 611 2 
FA 52 164 0 212 22 70 222 0 252 22 
SD 189 102 0 293 16 248 134 0 282 12 
TN 34 39 315 342 14 22 25 205 258 21 
TX 48 19 348 381 12 30 12 214 272 19 
WA 412 3 0 509 5 504 7 0 597 4 
WI 6 184 0 278 1.8 9 253 0 334 10 
1Tbe sum of the deviations from 100. 2The lower the number, the more dependent the state 
on a particular commodity for its payment. 
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states and the irrigated states of the Southwest. The only cotton and 
wheat states in the lower half of the profile at Level I prices are Georgia 
and Colorado, both with substantial corn production to balance their 
economy. 
At Level II prices, the northern wheat states remain relatively more 
vulnerable than the national average because wheat payments constitute 
only 19% of the u.S. total payment under the model (table 10). Higher 
cotton payments (42% of the U.S. payments compared to only 22.5% 
under Level I) make the cotton states relatively less vulnerable, although 
all but Georgia are in the middle one-third of the profile. Corn states, 
except Iowa and Wisconsin (both with no cotton and almost no wheat 
crop), remain least vulnerable due to the widespread suitability of corn to 
most regions. 
The same procedure depicts the vulnerability of farm size classes to 
changes in the target price of each commodity. The larger the farm, the 
more likely payment limitations will be applied at any target price level. 
The more specialized the large farm, the more sensitive it is to changes in 
the target price of a particular commodity, and the more vulnerable it is to 
application of the limitation when even small target price increases are 
provided for that commodity. If large farms tend to be more dependent on 
a particular commodity, political opposition to the payment limitation 
can be expected to generate from commodity groups representing that 
commodity. The results of this procedure are presented in Table 11. 
TABLE 11 
Index of Commodity Vulnerability by Farm Size 
LEVEL I LEVEL II 
Farm Size Class Wheatl Corn1 cottonl Cumulative 2 Wheat Corn Cotton CumuJ.ati ve 
Large Farms IC 73 54 238 211 54 4c 177 183 
IE 90 85 145 70 81 77 131 73 
Moder ate Farms IA 94 104 98 12 95 104 98 11 
2 105 100 73 41 112 117 78 51 
Sm~ Farms 3 111 103 81 33 116 108 85 39 
4 107 99 94 14 109 100 96 13 
5 97 100 102 5 97 100 102 5 
Rural Residence 6 83 105 107 29 82 103 105 26 
I The closer the nuber is to 100, the more the class dependence on the crop approximates the dependence of 
all farms on the crop; the more above 100, the greater the dependencej the more below 100, the less the 
dependence. 
2The sum of the deViations from 100. 
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Large farms (Classes Ib and Ic) are most commodity-dependent at both 
price levels. They depend heavily on cotton. Moderate-sized farms 
(Classes Ia and II) show considerable balance, particularly at the upper 
end of the size range. The smaller farms within this size group are 
wheat-corn dependent. Small farms (Classes III, IV and V) at the lower 
end of their size range are fairly commodity-insensitive. They tend to 
become wheat and, to a lesser extent, corn sensitive at the upper end of 
the range, and cotton sensitive at the lower end where the index for cotton 
rises at both price levels. Rural residences (Class VI) are slightly 
cotton-sensitive. These results for Level I prices are shown graphically in 
Figure 3. For Level II, the curves differ only in degree, not shape. 
Political Analysis 
Insight is provided by determining congressional districts likely to be 
politically sensitive to changes in the payment limitation, and assessing 
those representatives serving on congressional committees likely to have 
jurisdiction on the payment limitation issue. The committees most likely 
to have jurisdiction are the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, 
especially the subcommittees5 shaping commodity policy, and the House 
Appropriations Committee and its Subcommittee on Agriculture. 
States selected for Senate analysis have more than the national 
average of percent farms affected by the $10,000 limitation at Level I 
payments (2.0%), and are in the upper half of the vulnerability index at 
Level I payments. 
Ten states meet the Senate criteria: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, and Washing-
ton. Among the 20 Senators representing these states, four are members of 
the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, and one (Senator 
Thad Cochran, Democrat Mississippi) is a member of the subcommittee 
of jurisdiction over the payment limitation. 
Congressional districts within these states are selected for House of 
Representatives analysis if they contain one or more counties (or parts of 
counties) listed in the 1974 Census of Agriculture among the top 100 
producing counties of one or more of the commodities for which 
payments are made, and if the cumulative percentage of the national crop 
produced in those counties in 1974 exceeded one percent. 
Seven of the 10 states meeting the Senate criteria contain congressio-
nal districts meeting the House criteria (Alabama, Idaho, and Oregon did 
5 The House Subcommittees on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar and on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains; 
and the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization. 
not). There are 17 districts in three general crop regions. These districts 
are presented in Table 12. Of the 17 congressmen representing these 
districts, nine are on the House Agriculture Committee, including the 
chairman of the committee (E. de la Garza, Democrat Texas), and 
chairmen of the two principal subcommittees with jurisdiction over the 
limitation issue (David R. Bowen, Democrat Mississippi, and Thomas S. 
Foley, Democrat Washington). Seven of the 17 members of the Cotton, 
Rice, and Sugar Subcommittee come from these key districts; three of the 
19 members of the Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains Subcommittee 
come from these key districts. Foley is also the House Majority Whip. 
TABLE 12 
Region 
Irrigated 
Soathwest 
Delta 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Congressional Districts in which 
Payment Limitation has Most Impact 
Key Districts 
Arizona 4 
California 15 
17 
18 
43 
Texas 13 
15 
17 
19 
Arkansas 1 
4 
Louisiana 5 
Mississippi 1 
Washington 4 
Representative 
Eldon Radd (R) 
Tony Coelho (D) 
Charles Pashayan, Jr. (R) 
William M. Thomas (R) 
Clair W. Burgener (R) 
Jack Hightower (D) 
E de la Garza (D) 
Charles W. Stenholm (D) 
Kent Hance (D) 
Bill Alexander (D) 
Ber~l Anthony, Jr. (D) 
Jerry Huckaby (D) 
Jamie L. Whitten (D) 
David R. Bowen (D) 
G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery 
(D) 
Sid Morrison (R) 
Thomas S. Foley (D) 
Key Assignments (Com/Sab) 
Appropria tions 
Agriculture/Cotton, Rice&Sugar 
Agricultare/Cotton,Rice&Sagar 
Appropriations 
Appropriations/Agricaltare 
Agriculture (Chair) 
Agriculture/cotton, Rice&Sugar 
Wheat,Soybeans&Feed Grains 
Appropriations/Agricalture 
Agriculture/Cotton,Rice&Sugar 
Agriculture/Cotton, Rice&Sugar 
Wheat,Soybeans&Feed Grains 
Appropriations (Chair)/ 
Agricalture (Chair) 
Agriculture/Cotton, Rice&Sugar 
(Chair) 
Agriculture/Cotton, Rice&Sugar 
Majority Whip 
Agricalture/Wheat,Soybeans & 
Feed Grains (Chair) 
In addition, five of the 17 are members of the House Appropriations 
Committee, including three on the Agriculture Subcommittee. One, 
Jamie Whitten (Democrat Mississippi), is Chairman of both. 
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Only three of the 17 congressmen do not hold committee assignments 
likely to address the payment limitation issue. The districts are notably 
cotton producers. Ofthe 17, 15 contain counties listed among the top 100 
cotton-producing counties in the 1974 Census of Agriculture; two 
contain wheat producing counties. An estimated 61.9% of the nation's 
cotton is produced in these congressional districts. Only 5.6% of the 
wheat is produced in the two key congressional districts showing 
substantial wheat production. There are no key congressional districts 
with substantial corn production. 
It is apparent, particularly in the House of Representatives, that the 
political interests of those most affected by the limitation and thosewho 
would be most adversely affected by lowering the limitation level are 
well represented on key committees and subcommittees. 
Conclusions 
Although the limitation on direct payments to farmers under the 
major commodity programs is often regarded as a policy tool with 
structural implications, it primarily is enacted to save money for social 
and other programs. It has been loosely assumed that the impact of the 
limitation is in direct proportion to farm size, and raising and lowering 
the limitation simply truncates the payment profile at various farm size 
levels. This assumption ignores payments based on NCAs for covered 
commodities and that farm size as measured by cash recei pts is a function 
of all commodities produced. 
A model, that assumes full participation in the farm programs in 30 
states cumulatively producing over 90% of the corn, wheat, and cotton 
crops, determines the impact of the payment limitation on farm size 
structure. The model examines six cases involving three limitations and 
two deficiency payment levels. The results indicate that at the current 
limitation level ($50,000 for all commodities in combination), the 
payment limitation has little effect. Even at high deficiency payment 
levels, only 2.0% of the farms producing the indicated commodities are 
affected. They are primarily cotton farms in the irrigated Southwest and 
the Delta states. Only 17% of the large farms (> $200,000 in sales) are 
affected. More medium-sized farms ($40,000-$199,999 in sales) are 
affected than large farms by almost two-to-one. 
As the payment limitation is lowered, more large farms are affected, 
but proportionally the medium-sized farms are affected more. At a 
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$10,000 limitation with high deficiency payments, 16% of the farms are 
affected, but medium-sized farms out-number large farms among the 
affected by a ratio of four-to-one. While 77% of the large farms are 
affected, 39% of the medium-sized farms are, too. At this level, even small 
farms ($5,000-$39,000 in sales) are affected. Nearly half as many as large 
farms are affected. Thus, the payment limitation does not discriminate 
well among farm sizes, even at levels severe enough to affect significant 
numbers of large farms. 
The model also assesses vulnerability of states and large farms to loss 
of income due to payment limitation because of a target price increase of a 
commodity the state or farms are dependent upon more than the nation as 
a whole. The vulnerability of large farms to this loss of income also is 
assessed. Northern wheat-producing states and cotton-producing states 
in the Delta and irrigated Southwest proved most vulnerable. Nationally, 
large farms are extremely sensitive to changes in the price of cotton, and 
even a small increase in the target price of cotton would result in loss of 
income due to the payment limitation in states with large cotton farms. 
Political analysis indicates the states and congressional districts 
within them in which cotton production is concentrated. These states are 
heavily represented on congressional committees and subcommittees 
with jurisdiction over the payment limitation, particularly in the House 
of Representatives. A reduction in the payment limitation is, therefore, 
politically most offensive to those best in a position to shape the fate of 
such a proposal. 
Unfortunately, inadequate data on the distribution of NCAs within 
sales size categories prevents the model from determining the amount of 
payment foregone by each group. The size of the foregone payment, as 
well as its proportion to the total payment, may vary by farm size and 
offer a different perspective on the structural impact of the payment 
limitation. 
If the limitation is applied to farm size rather than payment amount, 
significant shifts in impact are apparent. At the lower level of deficiency 
payments, a limitation based on farm size affects more farms than a 
payment limitation of $10,000, and they tend to be more specialized 
(producing only one of the specified commodities). Among enterprise 
types and agronomic regions, there is a shift from cotton to corn and 
wheat under such a limitation. This is probably attributable in corn- and 
wheat-producing states in part to the large number of livestock and dairy 
enterprises which produce relatively less grain than cash grain or cotton 
farms in the same sales category and, therefore, are affected less by a 
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limitation based on size of deficiency payment. 
Although fewer farms are affected in the Cotton Belt than in the Corn 
Belt, both the percentage of farms affected and the share of total state 
payments lost is much higher in the Cotton Belt, especially in the 
irrigated Southwest and to a lesser extent in the Mississippi Delta states. 
Most important, under a limitation based on farm size, three-fourths 
of the affected farms would not be affected by a payment limitation set at 
$10,000, and only 40% of the farms that could be affected by such a severe 
payment limitation are affected by the farm size limitation. Thus, policy 
makers could expect a shift from payment limitation to farm size 
limitation would result in larger payments to many farms , and no 
payment to some farms now receiving small payments. 
Administration of the payment limitation has been difficult since its 
inception. Since 1970, procedures have been strengthened periodically 
and appear to be settled and reasonably effective. Shifting to limitation 
based on farm size rather than payment size would Significantly 
complicate administration because it requires a new set of administrative 
procedures requiring disclosure of marketing receipts from producers. 
This likely would be regarded as an invasion of commercial and personal 
privacy by many producers and probably would be opposed by many 
who would benefit from a policy shift. 
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Appendix: 
Assumptions 
Full participation 
No set-aside 
No diversion 
Computational Procedure 
Normal crop acres = planted acres 
Parameters 
All Y classes are 8 Census Sales Classes (VI - IC) 
All x classes are 7 enterprise combinations of farms producing wheat (W), 
corn (K), and/or cotton (C) 
Ny = number farms in y class Nx = number of farms in x class 
Y = established program yield, 1978 
A = acres planted to each commodity in each xy class 
L = Payment Limitation 
L1 = actual 1980 limitation; $50,000 
L2 = 30,000 
L3 = 10,000 
Pt = Target Price 
Pn = actual program target price, 1980 
Pt2 = higher than actual target price, using high cost of production 
data 
Pm = USDA predicted market price, 1980, except for cotton where 
lower-than-predicted price was used in order to generate a de-
ficiency payment 
29 
Formulas 
1. D = Pt - Pm 
where D = Deficiency Factor 
2. TAPxy = LAPcwk 
where TAP = Total Average Payment per farm in each xy class 
and AP cwk = Acwk . Y cwk . Dcwk 
3. TPy = LTAPx 
where TPy is the total payment to farms in each Y class 
4. AL = L for all xy classes 
D..;-Y 
where AL = acres needed to trigger a payment equal to the payment 
limitation. 
For mixed commodity enterprises, accumulate the limited payment 
attributed to the pro-rata share of the TAP attributed to each 
commodity in the enterprise 
4.1 AL = Lc + Lk + Lw 
----
Dc";-Yc Dk";-Yk Dw";-Yw 
where Lc = APc , Lk = APk, and Lw = APw 
TAP TAP TAP 
5. Fxy = LFz 
where F xy is the percent of xy farms affected by Land F z is the 
percent of xy farms in seven z farm acreage size intervals from 
Census table 33 and where 
5.1 AAz.s; AL 
where AAz = average acres per farm in z and where 
A 'Y'Pm > Sy 
where Sy is the upper sales size interval for y class 
6. AFxy = Fxy . Nxy 
where AF is the number of farms in xy class affected by L. 
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